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9 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference with DIA Regarding Level of Logistical Support
Needed by Communist Forces in South Vietnam


1. On 6 August 1965 three representatives of DIA, Production Center, Col. Donald Husman, Major John Clark, and Mr. Daniel Ewanik, met with T/TR analysts to discuss CIA adjustments of DIA estimates of logistic requirements for the Viet Cong (VC) and Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in South Vietnam. The conference was held at the request of General Maples of DIA who wanted CIA and DIA to reach an agreed position regarding the estimated logistics requirements before CIA published a report entitled, Analysis of the Problems of Foreign Logistic Support to the Communist Main Force in South Vietnam. According to Col. Husman, General Maples was under the impression that the CIA estimate was not very different from the DIA estimate and, therefore, he expected there would be no serious problem in reaching an agreement. Apparently General Maples had in mind the CIA estimates given in an earlier draft of the current CIA report. At present CIA and DIA estimates are as follows for the current level of activity in South Vietnam (in short tons per day).

	<u>DIA</u>	<u>CIA</u>
Viet Cong Regular Force	4.0	0.732
Food for Porters and Infiltrators	5.0	(3.0 - not included in CIA total) **
PAVN Division in South Vietnam	4.0*	0.196*
	<u>13.0</u>	<u>0.928</u>

* DIA believes that less than a PAVN division, only about 3,600 men, are in South Vietnam and the requirement was computed on a per man basis, while CIA's estimate was computed for 9 battalions.

** This tonnage would be consumed if 3,600 porters were used on the trails. This number of porters could deliver 6 tons into South Vietnam.

DIA review(s) completed.



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Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200090009-1

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Requirements for escalated scales of combat also differ, in particular for the PAVN forces. After more than two hours of discussion it was decided that no agreement could be reached and major differences in the estimates still existed.

2. The difference between CIA and DIA estimates of the requirements for the VC at the current level of combat are not substantial and are explained by differences in basic assumptions. DIA actually believes that even less than 21 battalions of the VC main force are currently equipped with the new family of Kloc weapons, but in calculating the current requirement they assumed that all the VC forces (now estimated to include 69,000 men) are currently equipped with these weapons and need ammunition from outside the country. Thus they have overstated the current requirement. CIA estimates that 40 VC battalions (21,200 men of a total of 64,000 VC) are currently equipped with these weapons; thus the CIA estimate includes ammunition and replacement weapons for only 40 battalions. We are, nevertheless, in basic agreement on the logistic requirements on a per man or per battalion basis.

3. Requirements for the PAVN force is the major area of disagreement. DIA estimates that at the current level of fighting the PAVN forces of about 3,600 men, or only portions of 9 battalions, need nearly $\frac{1}{4}$ tons per day while CIA estimates that 9 full battalions are presently in South Vietnam and need only about $\frac{1}{5}$ of a ton per day. The DIA estimate is based on a greatly scaled-down estimate of what PAVN forces in North Vietnam would use in light combat. The CIA estimate is based on the assumption that the PAVN battalions obtain food and petroleum from within South Vietnam and that their requirement for the remaining supplies is only 20 percent higher than similarly equipped VC battalions. These requirements by class for a PAVN division of 9 full battalions appear as follows in short tons per day:

	<u>DIA Estimate</u>	<u>CIA Estimate</u>
Class I - Food	5.31	Negligible
Class II & IV (Except Weapons)	2.70	0.023
Class III - Petroleum	1.25	Negligible
Class II - (Weapons Only)	-	0.005
Class V - (Ammunition)	2.70	0.168
	<u>11.96</u>	<u>0.196</u>

4. The DIA representatives ended the meeting with an urgent and strong request that CIA not publish the proposed report. They believed that the various estimates of the Communist requirements would only confuse US policy makers. They also said that the DIA estimates of logistic support needed for the current level of combat were far less than the estimated Communist capability to provide this support and that CIA estimates only reinforce this conclusion. Therefore, the CIA report would not provide any new information or conclusions. Furthermore, higher officials, such as the Secretary of Defence and General Taylor, are convinced that the Communist forces in South Vietnam need even more support than DIA estimated and, therefore, the CIA estimates would seem ridiculously low to such officials. Col. Rusan called again on 9 August and repeated General Maples request that CIA not publish the report. General Maples hopes that a joint estimate at the USIB level can be arranged.

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